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Abstract:    This study tests the assertion that membership growth in credit unions is constrained by their 
unique structural features, such as their non-profit mission and member-based ownership.  Although these 
features enhance inclusiveness, existing theory suggest that they work against efficiency when 
membership grows too diffuse.   To address this issue, this study uses a model that takes into account 
existing theory on constrained-optimization in credit unions and theory on the adverse effects of diffuse 
ownership.   Using data on 36 public credit unions in Ecuador, the empirical analysis finds evidence that 
credit unions can achieve economies of scale despite their problematic structural features. One possible 
explanation for this result may stem from the level of formality in Ecuador‘s financial system including 
its level of prudential regulation, information technology, and capital market formation. Moreover, the 
optimal credit union size may be a function of institutional and technological development in addition to 
their unique structural features.  This conclusion has important implications on policies aimed at 
expanding credit access in developing financial markets.  
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1. Introduction: 
When I arrived in Ecuador for my semester abroad, my goal was to better understand 
problems surrounding credit access.  As it turned out, I was able to volunteer at a small private 
credit union in Quito.  Unfortunately, this credit union was on the brink of insolvency, having 
over $80,000 in delinquent loans.  To make matters worse, the accountant left earlier that year 
for a better paying position and the former manager quit after stealing $10,000 from the savings 
portfolio.  Although this volunteer experience was a bit dispiriting, it highlighted some of the 
most critical problems facing credit providers in developing countries.  
Specifically, these problems are known as agency problems, which include managerial 
expense-preference (demonstrated in the manager‘s rent-seeking behavior) and member 
delinquency (shown through the cascading failure of members to repay loans).  Existing theory 
(Branch and Baker (1998), Labie and Perilleux (2008)) states that agency problems usually result 
from diffuse ownership, meaning that credit unions with more members are more susceptible.  
Paradoxically, in my case the credit union was small and private, which according to theory 
means it should exhibit fewer problems.  To confound matters further, throughout the city large 
public credit unions were flourishing.   
As a result, my attention turned to the question of formality, which was the variable 
differentiating my small private credit union from the larger credit unions in Ecuador.  Formal 
institutions could be the confounding variable because they provide transparency and 
accountability, which in turn reduce the information asymmetries that lead to agency problems.  
Ecuador is known for its relatively well-developed institutions
1
 (Branch and Baker, 1998: 24) 
including its system of prudential regulation, contract enforcement, and capital markets.  This 
                                                          
1
 Institutional development as understood as the process of formalizing ‗the rules of the game‘ that define 
relationships of trust.   
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explanation would reconcile theory and evidence because it explains why smaller private credit 
unions outside the formal financial system may have more agency problem than larger public 
credit unions within the formal financial system. 
To address the possibility that formal institutions reduce agency problems, this paper 
examines 36 public credit unions
2
 within Ecuador‘s formal financial system and uses a testable 
model that generates the optimal size in terms of members. If the optimal size is relatively large, 
then it suggests that a formal financial system enables credit unions to attain higher levels of 
access and efficiency despite their member-based ownership structure.  What the empirical 
analysis finds is that the optimal credit union size is relatively large, resulting in three 
implications: (1) credit unions may not be as growth constrained as previously thought, (2) the 
optimal credit union size is most likely determined by the level of institutional development in 
addition to its organizational structure, and (3) credit unions can serve as an effective vehicle for 
expanding credit access despite existing perceptions.   
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the background and literature; 
Section 3 develops a conceptual model that determines the optimal membership level; Section 4 
assembles the empirical model; Section 5 discusses the data and the specifications; Section 6 
explains the methodology, analyzes the empirical finding, and provides anecdotal support; 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 According to the Cooperative Law of Ecuador No. 1031 of September 7, 1996, General Law on 
Institutions of the Financial System No. 72, and the Executive Decree No. 1227 of March 19, 1998, credit unions are 
defined as ―private-sector societies, made up of individuals or entities which, without pursuing profit, take in savings 
and deposits, make discounts, grant loans to their members and make payments and collections on their account‖ 
(WOCCU, 2005: 318). 
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2. Literature Review: 
Levine (1997) shows that credit is a central force in the process of development and more 
generally in the process of wealth creation.  In developing countries the persistent lack of credit 
is a major obstacle to growth with an estimated three billion people lacking access to basic 
financial services (Helms, 2006: 1).  The chief driver of credit scarcity is uncertainty faced by 
creditors when measuring borrower risk.
3
   
Two popular strategies for expanding credit access under conditions of uncertainty stem 
from Yunus (1999) and de Soto (2000).  Yunus (1999) promotes the microfinance model, which 
transfers risk from creditors to borrowers through group-based lending (Stiglitz, 1990: 351-
353).
4
  Developing a more system-wide approach, de Soto (2000) identifies the underlying 
causes of credit scarcity, namely the high costs of obtaining property rights, the lack of contract 
enforcement, and overly complex legal systems.  Minimizing the costs of obtaining formal proof 
of creditworthiness enhances transparency and enables creditors to more formally ascertain 
borrower risk. 
Although the above approaches have successfully increased credit access, one alternative 
overlooked in the literature is the credit union model.  In 2007 credit unions numbered over 
2,500 with more than $30 billion in assets in Latin America (WOCCU, 2008: 3).  In terms of 
membership, credit unions in Latin America grew from 23 to 30 million members in 2007, an 
                                                          
3
 This uncertainty is due to the high costs of processing borrower information, which either (1) forces 
creditors to charge inflated interest rates to individuals with no credit history or (2) forces borrowers to enter the 
formal credit system which may have relatively high barriers to entry, especially in developing countries as argued 
in de Soto (2000).  Individuals that cannot afford either of these options must self-finance, slowing their economic 
mobility and reinforcing intergenerational poverty. Therefore, findings ways to lower the costs of processing 
information on borrower risk is an important part in integrating more people into financial markets, increasing 
investment, and improving growth rates.    
4
 In microfinance borrower risk is processed through peer-monitoring since additional financing is 
conditional upon the successful repayment each group member‘s loan.  Another advantage of microfinance is that 
borrowers have access to decentralized information, making them better situated to process risk and select a group 
with a higher probability of loan repayment (reducing adverse selection).   
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annual growth rate of 25% (WOCCU, 2008:3; WOCCU, 2007:3).  Credit unions merit further 
academic inquiry (especially in the context of expanding credit access) because they avoid the 
lending requirements of formal banks while offering credit at competitive interest rates due to 
member-based ownership.  In addition, credit unions may be an appealing alternative for 
policymakers because they avoid the donor-based financing needed in microfinance (Grameen-
style) and the challenge of raising bureaucratic efficiency in granting property rights as argued in 
de Soto (2000). The relatively greater market capture of credit unions compared to Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) (Figure 1) and the unchanging status of property rights reform (Figure 2) 
show the appeal of credit unions as a way to expand credit access.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 1: Source IDB (2008) and WOCCU (2007), (2008)         Figure 2: Source World Bank Group (2008) 
On the other hand, credit unions face several disadvantages related to their organizational 
structure such as their non-profit mission, unclear fiduciary responsibilities, non-tradeable 
shares, and a one-person one-vote governance structure (resulting in unclear property rights).  
While these features achieve a higher level of access and inclusiveness, they detract from 
efficiency and make credit unions susceptible to agency problems.  Branch and Baker (1998) and 
Labie and Perilleux (2008) theorize that membership growth exacerbates these defects and 
deteriorates the ability of principal(s) to monitor agents‘ decisions and minimize information 
asymmetries.   
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Due to this relationship there is a tradeoff between access and efficiency in credit unions.  
Leggett and Strand (2002) lend empirical support to this view by showing that membership 
growth contributes to expense preference in management and worse performance.  Additionally, 
Desrochers and Fischer (2002) find empirical evidence that diffuse ownership is a major cause of 
insolvency and institutional failure in credit unions.  Frame et al. (2002) show that credit union 
membership expansion dilutes the information advantages associated with a tight common-bond 
of association, even though it reduces risk concentration and raises investment opportunities.  
Branch and Baker (1998) and Labie and Perilleux (2008) offer several ways to mitigate agency 
problems in credit unions in order to raise both accessibility and efficiency (see Table 1).  
Table 1 
Authors Structural Issue Resulting Agency Problem Solution 
  
Members are clients as well as 
owners. 
Can develop into borrower domination of 
board of directors. 
Require that board is composed of savers, 
penalize mismanagement, and adopt rules to 
prevent conflicts of interest. 
  
One person one vote: all shares 
are given equal weight in voting. 
Causes dilution of property rights and a free 
riding mentality.  Less incentive to exercise 
fiduciary responsibilities.  
Allow external supervision and offer 
competitive financial services to maintain 
member interest. 
Branch and 
Baker 
(1998). 
Low income owners without high 
levels of business expertise. 
Leads to a board of directors without 
necessary financial knowledge.  
Require that the board is composed of 
professionals. 
 
Diffuse ownership.  
Higher separation between ownership and 
control, makes monitoring costly.  
Board that efficiently constrains managerial 
decision making.  Maintain internal controls 
and oversight of the board.   
  
Non-profit objectives can obscure 
the need for high managerial 
compensation.  
Low managerial compensation can lead to 
poor performance. Board may be unwilling to 
offer competitive wages. 
Efficiency wages are needed to attract 
professionals with the necessary technical 
skills for running a large credit union. 
  
Non-tradeable shares and no 
market for corporate control.  
Leads to "expense preference" when managers 
do not act in the interests of owners.  
Managerial compensation tied to performance, 
external and internal supervision. 
  Managerial "entrenchment". Managers exploit informational monopoly. 
Avoid excessive concentration of managerial 
responsibilities. 
  
Information is not communicated 
between members and board.   Board may not promote interests of owners. 
Board rotation and require regular contact 
with members. 
 Labie and 
Perilleux 
(2008).   
Professionals and volunteers 
define the mission of credit union 
differently. 
Professionals favor economic efficiency over 
social objectives.  
Established integration process to maintain 
credit union social mission. 
  
When membership expands the 
bonds of association deteriorate.  
Leads to free riding attitudes, less scrutiny of 
governance, and less peer monitoring.   Maintain rigorous membership requirements. 
  
Increased complexity of services 
and products.  
Leads to less member knowledge and thus less 
control.  
To be eligible for board member must be a 
business professional.  
  
Credit union networking and the 
consolidation of different 
institutions. 
Conflict between central and local governance 
levels, weakens internal control of credit 
union. 
Adopting standardized rules and control 
mechanisms in networked credit unions. 
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Table 1‘s solutions mainly focus on improving the institutions surrounding credit union 
governance to increase the monitoring of agents‘ decisions.  The emergence of these institutions 
is closely associated with the formalization of a financial system.  One developing country with 
many of these institutional features is Ecuador, which is specifically identified in Branch and 
Baker (1998).  These institutional features include a relatively rigorous system of prudential 
regulation
5
 and some capital market formation permitting corporate consolidation and economies 
of scale.  Economies of scale improve monitoring in two ways:
 6
 (1) they enable credit unions to 
exploit information technologies to more accurately measure borrower risk, screen loans, and 
manage accounting information
7
 and (2) they make it possible to hire full-time lawyers and 
collections officers to strengthen contract enforcement, to create stronger loan repayment 
incentives, and to lengthen members‘ time-horizons (as the risks of insolvency decline).  
Moreover, the benefits of economies of scale contribute to improved monitoring capabilities and 
fewer corporate governance issues. Figure 3 and 4 offer conceptual models that show the effect 
of institutional and technological improvements on the optimal size of credit unions.  
 
 
                                                          
5
 In terms of regulations, the Superintendency of Banks in Ecuador requires public credit unions to employ 
officials (including managers, directors, and members of supervisory committees) that meet a host of technical and 
experiential requirements (such as university degrees in economics or a finance related field), utilize internal and 
external auditors, hold managers liable for losses (with their own assets), and elect a supervisory committee in 
addition to the board of directors.  If necessary the Superintendency can impose civil and penal sanctions, remove 
the board of directors and designate a controller in their place, and file an involuntary liquidation order (WOCCU, 
2005: 318).  Also credit unions must maintain high capital reserves, limit loan concentration, provision for losses, 
and write-off delinquent loans (Branch and Baker, 1998: 28-30). As a whole this system of prudential regulation is 
relatively rigorous and provides monitoring procedures to compensate for the lack of member monitoring that occurs 
under diluted ownership.  
6
 Consolidation allows credit unions to have higher financial capabilities, improved liquidity management, 
and greater job specialization (Labie and Perilleux, 2008: 5).  Wheelock and Wilson (2008) confirm these 
advantages by providing evidence of increasing returns to scale from consolidation in US credit unions.   
7
 These improvements enhance managerial control by improving information management, leading to 
narrower information asymmetries and lower delinquency rates.  Goddard et al. (2008) offer evidence of this 
relationship, showing a strong correlation between credit union consolidation and the use of information technology. 
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Figure 3:  The shift from I0 to I1 represents an improvement in the level of institutional development causing a shift 
in the Long Run Average Total Cost Curve thereby permitting a higher optimal size.  In the bottom figure, the 
change from I0 and I1 causes a shift in the Marginal Cost of Information curve (representing the cost of monitoring).  
As membership moves beyond the optimal point, the marginal cost of information exceeds the marginal benefit 
causing information asymmetries and agency problems (which is subsequently reflected in the increasing Average 
Total Cost curve above).  In sum, the shift from I0 and I1 causes a change in the cost structure of information which 
enables credit unions to achieve a larger optimal size.    
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Figure 4:  Information falls into two categories: soft (which is tacit and accumulated over time through repeated 
interactions) and hard (which is quantifiable and thus easily communicated with technology).  Advances in 
information technology lower the price of hard information, allowing credit unions to grow (shown in the shift in the 
left model).  However, one potential feedback effect of increased reliance on hard information is that soft 
information becomes more costly to gather due to diffuse ownership (shown in the shift in right model).  This 
feedback effect forces credit union size to contract in order to restore the optimal balance between hard and soft 
information. 
Given the relationship between institutional and technological development and the 
optimal size of credit union size, it appears that formalizing a financial system is an effective 
way to expand credit access.  Although the explicit social and communal features fall to the 
wayside as credit unions enter the formal system and grow, the net effect is a more resilient, 
more efficient, and overall more inclusive financial system as asserted in Jones (2006).  This 
paper builds from this perspective and tests if the credit unions within Ecuador‘s formal system 
can attain both efficiency and accessibility. 
The lack of attention given to credit unions in development discourse suggests that 
theoretical misconceptions exist about their optimal size in developing countries.  When 
attention is given it is often confined to the informal context, a setting well known for mixed 
Soft Info 
Usage 
Hard Info Usage 
Institutional Change and Information 
Usage 
Feedback Effect of Membership Growth on 
Information Usage 
Soft Info 
Usage 
Hard Info Usage 
Left Model: Institutions Develop  Increases Hard 
Info Usage  Membership Growth 
Right Model: Membership Growth  Lowers Soft 
Information Usage  Membership Contracts 
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credit union performance (creating a bias against credit unions).
 8
  What this study does 
differently is it hones in on Ecuador and theorizes that its nascent formal financial system 
enables credit unions to grow larger than expected and achieve economies of scale (while 
minimizing agency problems). 
3. Theory: 
 From a theoretical standpoint, to determine the optimal size of credit unions it is 
necessary to use theory on constrained-optimization in credit unions.  The following section lays 
the foundation for this process by identifying: (1) the objective function of credit unions, (2) the 
budget constraint, and (3) the effects of growth (measured in terms of members).  
 First, one of the defining features of credit unions is their unique objective function due 
to member based ownership and control.   Members exercise control in annual elections where 
they vote for a board of directors under a one-person one-vote system.  As a result, to understand 
the utility-maximizing behavior of members it is necessary to define their voting objectives.  
Smith (1984) does this by dividing members into two groups: net borrowers (members that have 
more loans than savings) who maximize their Net Gain on Loans (NGL) and net savers 
(members that have more savings than loans) who maximize their Net Gain on Savings (NGS).
9
   
Smith (1984) provides the following: 
 
UMembers = f (Net Gain on Loans
j
, Net Gain on Savings
j
)   (1) 
                                                          
8
 The valuable development text Perkins et al. (2006) confines discussion of credit unions to the agrarian 
context, leaving out the more varied and complex history of credit unions in development.  Also discussion of credit 
unions as a development model is missing in important Latin American development texts such as Franko (2006).  
9
 Smith (1984) makes the following assumption: (1) credit unions offer uniform rates across members, (2) 
alternative rates always exist and all members face the same alternatives, (3) other aspects that increase member 
utility such as service and product quality are neglected, (4) the relative differences between credit union rates and 
competitor rates drives membership demand, (5) all savings and loans have a maturity of one period (Smith, 1984: 
1156-1158).   
11 
 
Net Gain on Loans
j 
=  (r
j
LM – rL)      (2) 
Net Gain on Savings
j
 =  (rS – r
j
SM)      (3) 
Equation 2 shows Net Gain on Loans (NGL) as the difference between the market loan rate 
(r
j
LM) and credit union‘s specific loan rate (rL), so net-borrowers seek to maximize NGL by 
electing directors that distribute profits through cheaper interest rates on loans. On the other 
hand, Equation 3 shows Net Gain on Savings (NGS) as the difference between credit union 
savings rate (rS) and the market savings rate (r
j
SM), so net-savers seek to maximize NGS by 
electing directors that distribute profits through higher interest rates on savings (similar to the 
concept of a dividend).  Due to data constraints this study utilizes NGL as the dependent 
variable, but excludes NGS.
10
 
The second step in constrained optimization involves constructing a budget constraint.   
Building from Smith (1984), Bauer (2006) develops a workable budget constraint for credit 
unions.
11
 Bauer (2006) provides the following:     
B = rLL – rSS – rDMD – C(L,S) – ∆K ≥ 0     (4) 
This budget constraint (B) shows net revenue generated from loans (rLL), net dividends 
paid on savings accounts (rSS), the interest rate on liabilities interacted with total liabilities 
(rDMD), the costs associated with the level of loans and savings (C(L,S)), and change in capital 
reserves (∆K).  Furthermore, this study examines how well credit unions can maximize NGL 
subject to these constraints; accordingly the above variables are the basis for this study‘s 
explanatory variables.  For visual benefit, Figure 5 illustrates this process of constrained-
                                                          
10
 Recognizing the risk of omitted variable bias due to the exclusion of NGS, its worth saying that in 
general savings and loans rates are highly correlated and tend to diverge only in cases of extreme preferences 
towards net-savers or net-borrowers in the board of directors (Branch and Baker, 1998: 17).  By using fixed effects it 
is possible to control for these cases and reduce the loss of information.     
11
 Bauer (2006) makes the following assumptions: (1) loan and savings rates are homogenous for all 
members, (2) increases in NGL and NGS benefit all members holding all else equal, (3) the board of directors 
represent the preferences of the members, (4) the median director‘s preference is the preference of the institution, 
and (5) the preferences of the median director do not change (Bauer, 2006: 5-6).   
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optimization. It shows that as the budget constraint shifts outward the credit union moves to a 
higher indifference curve thereby optimizing the average member‘s utility.  Moreover, rightward 
movements of the budget constraint signal improved performance in terms of NGL and NGS.  
Finally the third step is to add a variable accounting for the effects of growth (in terms of 
members) to the budget constraint.
12
  The relationship between membership growth and NGL 
performance is expected to follow a non-linear, inverted U-shape path.  As membership expands 
credit unions experience returns to scale due to greater specialization of job functions and an 
improved ability to finance the loan portfolio.  Yet as membership exceeds a certain level, the 
increased separation of ownership and control leads to worse NGL performance.  Moreover, this 
relationship implies an optimal size in terms of members (See Figure 3). 
                                                          
12
 Theoretical works on the subject of organizational growth date back to Coase (1937) with the theory of 
organizational hierarchies and transaction costs.  More recently, Fama and Jensen (1983) describe how heightened 
organizational growth (and subsequent complexity) leads to increased separation between ownership and control.  
Although certain efficiencies are achieved in the separation of risk bearing and management functions, as a firm 
grows and information becomes more diffuse the cost of transferring information creates information asymmetries.  
To minimize these asymmetries and properly monitor agents‘ decisions, the management and control of decisions 
must be delegated throughout the organization.   
NGL 
NGS 
Median Director‘s 
Preferences 
B 
U 
U‘ 
B‘ 
Credit Union Utility 
Maximization 
       Figure 5 Borrowed from Bauer (2006). 
13 
 
The cause of the inverted U-shape path is the one-person one-vote system mentioned 
earlier which fixes ownership to the number of members rather the amount each has deposited.  
This voting system exacerbates separation between ownership and control because as 
membership grows the marginal voting power of each member decreases, leading to less control 
and unclear property rights.  As the dilution of ownership worsens, members become more 
disassociated with credit union governance leading to less oversight, free riding, and more 
delinquency.  To handle increased borrower risk, managers raise nominal interest rates, 
negatively affecting NGL performance.  Equation 5 and 6 connect the concepts of membership 
growth, ownership dilution, and nominal interest rates:       
it
j
 = rt + 1 + πt + 1 + θ
j
                                                                                         (5) 
θj = 1 /  + ε        (6)  
Equation 5 expresses the nominal interest rate on loans (it
j
) to the j
th 
member in time t as a 
function of the expected real interest rate (rt + 1), the expected inflation rate (πt + 1), and borrower 
risk of the j
th
 member (θj).  Equation 6 represents borrower risk as a function of ownership 
dilution (where S
j
/S
J
 represents the share dilution of j
th
 member‘s deposit and J represents total 
members) and uncertainty (ε).  Although Equation 6 is more heuristic than theoretical, it shows 
that increases in ownership dilution cause borrower risk to increase, thereby raising interest rates 
and adversely affecting NGL.   
 Having completed this constrained-optimization model taking into account the effects of 
growth, the next stage puts this theory into a testable form. 
4. Methodology: 
14 
 
This study divides the econometric methodology into two stages.  The first stage 
constructs a model using theory in section 3.  The second stage addresses the central question of 
this paper by estimating the optimal size in terms of members. Combining Equation 2 (the credit 
union objective function), Equation 4 (the budget constraint), Equation 5 and 6 (the effects of 
membership growth), and a few control variables it is possible to obtain the following: 
NGL = β0 + β1R + β2E + β3G + β4DC + β5NC+ β6KC + β7AD + β8rLM + β9P + β10M + β11M
2 + ε    (7)                                 
                  Revenue Variables    Cost Variables          Control Variables   Membership Growth 
Equation 7 shows the process of constrained optimization in credit unions.  It shows net gain on 
loans (NGL) as a function of variables that represent revenue, cost, controls, and membership 
growth.  The revenue variables are composed of profitability (R), managerial efficiency (E), 
and managerial expense (G) a proxy for the quality of managers or level of monitoring.  The cost 
variables are composed of debt performance (DC), the cost of non-performing loans (NC), and 
the cost of setting aside capital reserves (KC).  The additional control variables include asset 
diversification (AD) and differenced market interest rates (rLM) which conveys information about 
real interest rates, competitiveness, and inflation.  The variables (M and M
2
) account for size in 
terms of membership growth and its polynomial functional form.  Finally, fixed effects 
dummies (P) control for varying characteristics across credit unions and whether the credit union 
is biased towards net-savers or net-borrowers.  
After estimating the coefficients, the calculation for finding the optimal membership level 
is expressed in Equation 8:   
                                                                                           (8) 
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It is possible to calculate the optimal membership level by setting Equation 7 equal to zero and 
solving for M.  In the context of this study the optimal credit union size is considered a function 
of Ecuador‘s specific institutional features in addition to the specifications in Equation 7.  This 
assumes that all credit unions are subject to the same institutional conditions, which is reasonable 
given that all credit unions are large, public (no common bond), and regulated by the same 
government agency. 
5. Data: 
The data set is from 36 credit unions in Ecuador at the monthly frequency from a period 
between the December 2005 and August 2008.  The source of the data set is the Superintendency 
of Banks (Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros) in Ecuador.  In total there are 1110 
observations and eight explanatory variables in each model.  In Ecuador public credit unions are 
required to file monthly reports that include ―balance sheets, operating statements, statements of 
financial position and equity using the formats, scope and regularity and accounting rules 
established for them‖ (WOCCU, 2005: 318).  The data in this study are from these monthly 
financial reports and available through the Superintendency of Banks public database.  Table 2 
reports the measurements, expected signs, and summary statistics of the dependent and 
explanatory variables.
13
  The data set is balanced.   
Dependent Variable: Net Gain on Loans                                                                                                                     
NGL = Avg. Market Interest Rate – Credit Union Interest Rate (Mean 0.9, Standard Deviation 1.3) 
Explanatory Variables Measure Expected Sign Mean 
(Standard Dev.) 
Primary Specifications    
                                                          
13
 In literature that examines credit union performance, the preferred measure of variables are typically 
financial ratios (Richardson, 2002; Frame et. al, 2002; Leggett and Strand 2002; Braga et. al., 2006; Desrochers and 
Fischer, 2002).  Financial ratios offer a reasonable approximation of the conceptual model by accounting for the 
major determinants of revenue, cost, and changes in business, in spite of being rough approximations.   
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Revenue Variables    
Return on Assets Net Income / Average Assets + 9.2 (7.3) 
Efficiency Operational Expense / Financial Margin + 82.4 (51.8) 
Monitoring Managerial Expense / Average Assets    +/− 3.9 (1.6) 
Cost Variables    
Debt Performance Productive Assets / Expense on Liabilities    +/− 130.0 (33.1) 
Delinquency Cost Delinquency Rate − 4.9 (2.7) 
Capital Reserves Capital Provisions / Delinquent Loans    +/− 305 (2,105) 
Control Variables    
Alternative Interest Rate Avg. Interest Rate (Not Differenced) + 14.5 (2.4) 
Asset Diversification Assets (Not Natural Logged) + 28.9m (25.3m) 
Membership Variables    
Members Number of Members + 50,412 (63,747) 
Members Squared Number of Members
2 
− 6.6E+09 (2.1E+10) 
Member Preferences Fixed Effects Dummies   
Alternative Specifications    
Alt. Revenue Variables     
Return on Equity Net Income / Average Equity + 1.8 (1.6) 
Alt. Cost Variables    
Vulnerability Delinquent Loans / (Net Income + Equity) − 14.0 (14.7) 
Liquidity Available Funds / Short Term Deposits    +/− 18.9 (11.3) 
Table 2  Source: Superintendency of Banks, Ecuador 2008 
 
The dependent variable is net gain on loans (NGL) and is determined by the average 
interest rate on loans for a period longer than one year subtracted by the individual credit union‘s 
interest rate.  The expected signs of the explanatory variables are straightforward.  Return on 
assets, efficiency, and monitoring expense account for the revenue side of the budget constraint 
and should improve NGL performance.  On the other hand, debt performance,
 14
 delinquency 
costs, and capital reserves account for the cost side and are expected to detract from NGL 
performance.  For the sake of robustness, alternative specifications on the cost side include 
vulnerability (substituting for delinquency costs) and liquidity (substituting for capital reserves).  
One alternative specification for the revenue side is return on equity (substituting for return on 
                                                          
14
 Note that larger values of debt performance signify improvements.   
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assets).
15
  Control variables include alternative market interest rates (differenced average of all 
credit union interest rates) and asset diversification as measured by the natural log of total assets, 
which should be positively related to NGL performance.  The last explanatory variables account 
for membership growth, where positive effects dominate at lower levels of membership and 
negative effects at higher levels.
16
 
6. Results and Analysis: 
This section offers description and analysis of the regression results and the estimated 
optimal size.  It concludes with some anecdotal support of the role of institutions on credit 
unions.  
6.1 The Regression Results: 
After running a series of diagnostics, the regressions in Table 2 appear to not suffer from 
severe multicollinearity or serial correlation, but have significant heteroskedasticity and require 
fixed effects.
 17
  Heteroskedasticity is corrected through the use of adjusted standard errors and 
generalized least squares estimation.   
                                                          
15
 Although the revenue and cost variables generally should increase or decrease NGL, respectively, theory 
does not provide a consensus on the sign for monitoring, debt performance, capital requirements, and liquidity.  As a 
result, as shown in Table 2 the expected signs for these variables are both positive and negative. 
16
 Due to a break in the data set, this study generated three rows of entries to fill in missing data on 
membership levels using a moving average over the missing dates. 
17
 According to the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data, the insignificant test statistic of 
0.0746 accepts for now the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  For more detail on the Wooldridge test see 
Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003).  Using a likelihood ratio test between two iterated GLS models with and 
without heteroskedasticity, the significant test statistic of 0.000 rejects the null hypothesis that there is no 
heteroskedasticity.  Finally according to a random effects versus fixed effects Hausman test, the significant test 
statistic of 0.000 rejects the null hypothesis of no systematic difference in the coefficient estimates.  Inefficiencies 
from multicollinearity are tolerated for two reasons: (1) dropping collinear variables does not severely alter 
coefficients and (2) it was not worth the risk of creating specification bias by omitting theoretically specified 
variables. 
Dependent Variable: Net Gain on Loans Fixed Effects Model   
Explanatory Variables Model 1.1 
(Within) 
Model 1.2 
(Within) 
Model 2.1  
(GLS) 
Model 2.2  
(GLS) 
Primary Specifications     
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Again, the results are classified into four categories: revenue variables, cost variables, 
control variables, and membership growth variables.  All variables had signs consistent with 
theory, except cost variables which were more ambiguous. A possible explanation for the 
ambiguous signage on costs could be that changes in cost do not necessarily factor into managers 
decisions to distribute profits through NGL (further research is necessary to substantiate this 
claim).  In addition, all variables were significant at the 5% level except for efficiency and 
monitoring and the alternative cost variables.  Although it is somewhat problematic that 
efficiency and monitoring (and to a lesser extent the alternative cost variables) are not 
significant, these measures may simply lack sufficient information to fully account for the 
specified concepts (especially since both are based upon measures of cost efficiency).  
Revenue Variables     
Return on Assets .2580 (5.92)*      .3055 (12.49)*  
Efficiency     .0005 (1.06) .0003 (.570) .0008   (1.24) .0007 (1.03) 
Monitoring  .1402 (1.67)        .1193 (1.43)         .0595   (0.98) .0460 (0.76) 
Cost Variables     
Debt Performance -.0105 (-6.14)*  -.0115 (-6.58)*  
Delinquency Cost .1119 (4.04)*   .1286 (4.00)* .1116  (5.22)* .1215 (5.60)* 
Capital Reserves  4.2e-5 (80.56)*  4.2e-5 (3.40)*  
Control Variables     
Alternative Interest Rate .2561 (26.69)* .2578 (29.89)* .2647 (12.91)* .2570 (12.09)* 
Asset Diversification 2.1082 (5.67)* 2.0249 (5.20)* 1.6486  (7.50)* 1.6896 (6.89)* 
Membership Variables     
Members 9.96e-6 (2.06)* 9.07e-06 (1.58) 1.49e-5 (4.08)* 1.46e-5 (3.93)* 
Members Squared -1.93e-11 (-2.35)* -1.54e-11 (-1.65) -2.72e-11 (-3.83)* -2.40e-11  (-3.38)* 
Member Preferences Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Dummies Dummies 
Alternative Specifications     
Alt. Revenue Variables     
Return on Equity  .04287 (4.18)*  .0544519 (10.48)* 
Alt. Cost Variables     
Vulnerability  -.0036 (-.80)  .0016 (0.53) 
Liquidity  -.0017 (-.32)  -.0012 (-0.23) 
R
2 0.27 0.26   
Wald Chi
2   627.44 567.08 
Table 3  *Denotes Significant at 5% Level 
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In terms of coefficients, changes in return on assets and asset diversification are shown to 
have a very strong positive effect on NGL performance.  Further, it appears that the quality 
(return on assets) and quantity (asset diversification) of assets play a very important role in 
determining the amount of profits distributed through interest rates on loans (or, said differently, 
increases in NGL).  Having briefly interpreted the regression results, it is time to estimate the 
optimal credit union size.   
6.2 Estimated Optima: 
Assuming that the conceptual model is theoretically valid and well specified, the next 
step is to use Equation 8 to calculate the optimal credit union size in terms of members.  Table 4 
shows the results according to the four separate models — each using the respective 
specifications and estimation techniques from the regressions‘ models.  All four estimated 
optima are weighted towards the larger side of the sample, putting the optimal size over 250,000 
members. 
 Model 1.1 
(Within) 
Model 1.2 
(Within) 
Model 2.1  
(GLS) 
Model 2.2 
(GLS) 
Estimated Optima 258,031 294,480 273,897 304,166 
Table 4     
 
Given that Model 1.1 provides the most conservative estimate and is the closest to theory 
in terms of specifications and estimation technique, this model‘s stability can be tested with 
bootstrap replications. The bootstrap results (presented in Figure 6) show that the minimum and 
maximum estimates for each set of replications display signs of convergence, indicating some 
stability in the estimated optima. 
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Figure 6: Note the x-axis represents the number of bootstrap replications and the y-axis represents the estimated 
optimal size in terms of members. 
Although these results offer evidence that credit unions can achieve economies of scale 
while avoiding agency problems, the fact remains that the average size of credit unions is around 
50,412 members.  Although credit unions may eventually narrow the gap between the optimal 
and average size, the optimal size plot along with the distribution of membership (Figure 7 and 8, 
respectively) suggest that there may be barriers preventing credit unions growth.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
Three hypotheses may explain the gap between the average and the optimal size:  (1) 
geography is a binding constraint on membership expansion, (2) lack of advertising is reducing 
the mobilization of members, and (3) incomplete capital markets or concerns in management 
over loss of credit union culture are hindering consolidation.  Table 5 briefly addresses these 
hypotheses by presenting the regional breakdown of branches, the websites, and membership 
totals of each credit union in the sample.
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Table 5 
 
Credit Unions Members Website Amazon Coast Sierra 
Small (7,500-30,000) 
SAN FRANCISCO DE ASIS 7843 http://www.csfasis.fin.ec     1 
CALCETA 10385     2   
SANTA ANA 10413 http://www.coacsa.com/portal/   2   
JESUS DEL GRAN PODER 10740 http://coopjesusdelgranpoder.com/       
GUARANDA 12307 http://www.guarandaltda.fin.ec/     3 
9 DE OCTUBRE 14213       2 
LA DOLOROSA 15989 http://www.ladolorosa.fin.ec/    1   
11 DE JUNIO 17402 http://oncedejunio.fin.ec/    3   
CACPE BIBLIAN 17998 http://www.cacpebiblian.fin.ec     3 
PADRE JULIAN LORENTE 22096 http://www.lorente.fin.ec/ 3   4 
COOPAD 22794 http://www.coopad.fin.ec   2 1 
SANTA ROSA 24108 http://www.coopacs.fin.ec   6   
CHONE 25472     3   
Medium (30,000-50,000) 
EL SAGRARIO 30007 http://www.elsagrario.com/    1 5 
COTOCOLLAO 30088 http://cooperativacotocollao.fin.ec/     1 
COMERCIO 36008 http://www.coopcomer.fin.ec/   1   
CACPE PASTAZA 36556   4   1 
SAN JOSE 37144 http://www.coopsanjose.fin.ec/    1 4 
SAN FRANCISCO 40953 http://www.coac-sanfra.com/  2   4 
23 DE JULIO 44259 http://www.coop23dejulio.fin.ec/     3 
TULCAN 45101 http://www.cooptulcan.com/site/     4 
PABLO MUÑOZ VEGA 48585 http://www.cpmv.fin.ec/     5 
ATUNTAQUI 49049 http://www.atuntaqui.fin.ec/     6 
Large (50,000-100,000) 
OSCUS 55814 http://www.oscus.fin.ec/     7 
CACPECO 56767 http://www.cacpeco.com   2 8 
CODESARROLLO 63253 http://www.codesarrollo.fin.ec 2 1 9 
ALIANZA DEL VALLE 68638 http://www.alianzadelvalle.fin.ec     3 
MEGO 73741 http://www.coopmego.com/ 2 1 8 
15DEABRIL 74163 http://coop15abril.fin.ec/   3   
RIOBAMBA 86040 http://www.cooprio.fin.ec/     7 
PROGRESO 88367 http://www.cooprogreso.fin.ec/      1 
Supersize (100,000-430,000) 
ANDALUCIA 101370 http://www.andalucia.fin.ec/     2 
JUVENTUD ECUATORIANA  105526 http://www.coopjep.fin.ec/   2 1 
CAMARA DE COMERCIO 129550 http://www.ccq.org.ec/     2 
29 DE OCTUBRE 333290 http://www.29deoctubre.fin.ec 6 8 13 
NACIONAL 429190 http://www.coopnacional.com/    1   
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For hypothesis 1 on the geographic constraint on membership expansion, there appears to 
be two prevailing strategies for branch expansion: (1) focus on geographic diffusion of regional 
branches or (2) focus on capturing a single large target population.  These divergent strategies 
are demonstrated in the case of the two largest credit unions 29 de Octubre which has 27 
branches and Nacional which has only one branch located in the largest and most populous city 
in Ecuador.  Although both strategies appear to effectively expand membership, further research 
is necessary to elaborate on the relative roles of diffused vs. concentrated membership expansion 
strategies to help credit unions grow to the optimal size.  
For hypothesis 2, since most of the credit unions have websites and are publicly-known, 
the evidence seems to lend itself against the idea that internet advertising is causing the gap 
between average and optimal size.  Additionally the websites are surprisingly sophisticated 
across credit union sizes, implying that the level of information technology across the sample 
may be relatively constant.    
For hypothesis 3, there seems to be a slight correlation between credit unions with a 
Catholic affiliation and small sizes.  For instance, San Francisco de Asis, Santa Ana, Jesus del 
Gran Poder, Padre Julian Lorente, and Santa Rosa are all in the smallest bracket of credit unions.  
Although these credit unions are open to the public, this informal bond may be affecting the 
willingness of managers to expand or merge with other credit unions that lack this affiliation.   
In sum, these three hypotheses present intriguing paths for further research on the gap 
between the average size and optimal size of Ecuador‘s public credit unions and offer an ongoing 
puzzle facing the ability of credit unions to expand credit access in Latin America. 
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(Members) 
Efficiency 
(Profitability) 
Green: Private Bank  
Red: Credit Union  
Blue: Donor-based Microfinance 
Black: Theoretical Optimum 
 
A B C D 
A: Informal Institutions (Agrarian Village) 
B: Nascent Formal Institutions (Ecuador) 
C: Developed Formal Institutions (US) 
D: Theoretical Institutional Convergence  
The Role of Institutional Development 
on Financial Intermediation 
Figure 9 
6.3 Anecdotal Support: 
The main limitation of this study is the absence of variables controlling for institutional 
development.  Under ideal circumstances, cross-country panel data would account for the effect 
of different institutional features on the optimal size of credit unions.  To compensate for the less 
than ideal data set, this next section uses anecdotal evidence to support the econometric findings.  
Although anecdotes are not a definitive empirical test, it places the regression results in the 
broader discussion of credit unions and shows a clearer relation between institutional 
development and optimal size.  Using Figure 9, this section divides the supporting evidence into 
three phases: (1) informal institutions, (2) nascent formal institutions, and (3) developed formal 
institutions.    
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The first stage consists of informal institutions usually within the agrarian context.  Under 
these conditions social networks with relatively informal rules determine access to credit unions. 
These credit unions often have a common bond of association, which enables them to process 
soft information (which is experience-driven and accumulated over time) on creditworthiness 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002: 2533).  At this stage credit unions rely upon relatively rudimentary 
means of conducting business using peer-monitoring to manage information and social sanctions 
to enforce contracts (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005: 138-140).   
Although growth is severely constrained and managers may lack financial acumen, credit 
unions are an appealing option at this stage due to their accessibility (Jones, 2006: 38).  
However, in some cases credit unions remain out of the reach of underserved social groups that 
lack enough human and social capital to organize a credit union (i.e. women in Bangladesh).  For 
these groups, microfinance institutions like the Grameen Bank are a more feasible alternative.  In 
reference to Figure 9, at this informal stage credit unions are much more accessible than private 
banks despite being less efficient and having to remain relatively small.  
The second stage of institutional development usually occurs in large urban areas
18
 with 
nascent formal institutions including a court system, formal property rights (however costly to 
obtain), prudential regulatory agencies, limited capital market formation (enough to permit 
consolidation and networking), and moderately-advanced data storage and loan-screening 
technologies (i.e. institutional features of Ecuador).  To take advantage of these nascent formal 
institutions, credit unions must adapt by growing larger and achieve some semblance of scale 
economies.   
                                                          
18
 Moving from the previous informal stage, increases in population density may contribute to the 
ossification and emergence of a formal system.  Specifically, as population grows the control of informal social 
networks may begin to deteriorate as rival social networks emerge.  The need for an overarching formal system 
capable of linking unconnected individuals becomes necessary, thereby requiring a state sanctioned formal system.  
Clearly more research is needed with respect to this topic.     
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One way to increase size is to broaden the membership base by relaxing the common 
bond requirement (Emmons and Schmid, 1999: 62).  The shift from a narrowly defined common-
bond to a more public system requires the use of ―hard information‖ which can be verified, 
recorded, and updated routinely (Petersen and Rajan, 2002: 2535).  Hard information includes 
official identification cards, proof of employment, and up-to-date information on utility or rent 
payments.  The advantage of hard information is that it allows for more impersonal economic 
relationships, making distance in both the social and geographic sense less important (Petersen 
and Rajan, 2002).  By implication, soft information which is obtained through repeated 
interactions over time can be partially substituted with hard information.
19
   
Moreover, the emergence of these nascent formal institutions strengthens trust between 
unconnected groups of individuals and shifts out the monitoring possibilities of managers thanks 
to hard information based technology (see Figure 3 and 4).  In reference to Figure 9, at this 
intermediate stage microfinance (Grameen-style) begins to fall out of usage as the costs of 
obtaining soft information increase (relative to hard), while private banks become more 
accessible as formal property rights become more affordable.  According to Figure 9, credit 
unions experience efficiency gains allowing them to grow larger and achieve scale economies.  
Presently Ecuador and most low-to-middle income countries are close to this stage of 
institutional development.    
Finally the third stage of institutional development consists of advanced economies with 
developed formal institutions (e.g. the US and most of Western Europe).  In this context, credit 
unions attain the highest level of access and efficiency and in the process become more formal, 
more professional, and more competitive with private banks.  At this advanced stage the focus 
                                                          
19
 It is likely that soft and hard information are not perfect substitutes as it may be necessary to sustain 
some level of soft information in order to maintain healthy financial intermediation.  See Figure 4 for more detail. 
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shifts away from social objectives towards commercial ones and in some cases credit unions 
choose to demutualize.  Another characteristic is that credit unions further relax the bond of 
association or may open to the public, leaving managers to chiefly depend on hard information to 
ascertain creditworthiness and enforce contracts.  Goddard et al. (2008) show that large formal 
credit unions in the US pursue complex financial products towards profitable-end while avoiding 
the problems that smaller credit unions encounter from growth.   In reference to Figure 9, at this 
stage credit unions mirror private banks in nearly every respect ranging from their selection of 
financial products to business strategy to operational sophistication.  In many ways at this 
advanced stage credit unions become substitutable with private banks.  
In sum, these three examples offer a reasonable story explaining how developing formal 
institutions raises the optimal credit union size despite the member-based ownership structure. 
7. Conclusion: 
Although theory suggests that the non-profit mission and member-based ownership 
structure of credit unions works at the expense of efficiency, the results raise the possibility that 
formality and institutional development enable credit unions to achieve economies of scale while 
avoiding the agency problems brought on by membership growth.  In spite of the fact that the 
regressions face some data constraints, the results should be interpreted seriously and should 
inform future research into the role of institutions on the optimal size of credit unions.   
The next stage of research should adopt a more experimental approach and should survey 
credit union performance across different levels of institutional development.  Such research 
could disaggregate institutional features along the lines of litigation services, costs of formal 
property rights, ratings of prudential regulatory agencies, level of capital market formation, and 
information technology investment (to account for the utilization of hard information).  It could 
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also survey credit unions in both informal and formal financial sectors.  In addition, further 
research is needed to explain the gap between the average size and optimal size of credit unions 
in Ecuador.  This puzzle may be explained by one of the three hypotheses explaining the 
observed gap such as (hypothesis 1) the relationship between spatial distribution of regional 
branches and population capture, (hypothesis 2) the role of advertising and information 
technology on member mobilization, and (hypothesis 3) the effect of capital market formation 
and managerial attitudes on corporate consolidation.   
In conclusion, credit unions should be considered in concert with other solutions for the 
problem of insufficient credit access in developing economies for three main reasons.  First, 
adopting Ecuador‘s institutional features may require less bureaucratic reform than de Soto‘s 
innovative solution of increasing bureaucratic efficiency in granting property rights.  Second, 
credit unions are able to remain competitive even in developed economies without the crutch of 
subsidization making them an attractive and enduring vehicle for pulling large amounts of 
individuals into the formal sector, which is a quality that donor-based microfinance lacks.  Third, 
the distinct institutional recipe explaining large and efficient credit unions in Ecuador appears to 
be reproducible, raising the possibility that it could be applied (albeit cautiously) to other 
economies.  More importantly, it appears that development discourse could benefit from a deeper 
consideration of credit unions as a leading vehicle for expanding credit access since the results 
suggest that they may be able to grow larger than expected, given the appropriate institutional 
controls. 
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